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Introduction 
Relative to other industrial countries, Japan continues to have very low 
levels of manufactured imports, a distinctive feature that has not been 
affected substantially by the high value of the yen since 1985. This aspect 
of Japan has been widely known by economists, but there is still substantial 
disagreement over the causes of the low level of imports. Can it be 
ascribed to implicitly protectionist behavior, or can it be explained by 
standard economic variables? As with most social science questions, the 
answer is probably a combination of many factors, none of which provides a 
complete explanation by themselves. 
This paper reviews the evidence on Japan for both the low level of 
imports and the low level of intra-industry trade, another pattern of trade 
which is very substantial for virtually all industrial nations except Japan. 
A variety of explanations have been offered by economists, political 
scientists, and business scholars, and these explanations are explored here. 
A final topic which cannot be ignored is the impact of the rising yen since 
1985 and how it is changing Japanese behavior. 
This paper, however, is not simply a review exercise. My conclusion 
from looking at the various possible explanations for Japan's behavior is 
that it cannot be entirely explained by standard economic factors. Overt 
import barriers may be relatively low, but other forms of informal barriers 
or collusive activity by Japanese corporations must be part of the 
explanation of Japan's distinctiveness.—Some changes in those behavior 
patterns may be underway, motivated by the high value of the yen, but the 
evidence for change is more readily visible in the press and government 
documents than it is in actual market behavior. My prognosis, therefore, is 
cautious: Japan is different; it is capable of changing; it may be entering 
V 
-2-
a lengthy period of adjustment; but that process is still in an early phase 
and it is unlikely to result in a Japan behaves entirely like other 
industrial nations. 
The Evidence on Unusual Trade Behavior 
Anecdotal evidence on protectionist Japanese import behavior and 
aggressive export behavior in the postwar period is abundant. Businessmen 
believe that they have faced, and continue to face, a variety of formal ani 
informal barriers impeding entry to the Japanese market, as well as 
predatory pricing, patent infringement and other practices which damage 
their ability to compete against Japanese products in third markets and at 
home in the United States. Demonstrating the peculiarity of Japanese 
practices ought to be a straightforward job of assembling facts, but the 
issue is not so simple because formal import barriers--tariffs and quotas -
-are no longer very significant in most cases and the existence of many 
other informal barriers has been vehemently denied by the Japanese. Despite 
these caveats, one approach to the question is to catalogue import barriers 
and estimate their probable impact on trade. Reviews of Japanese trade 
barriers are now widespread. 
1. This paper is based largely on extracts from a larger research project on 
Japan's trade patterns: Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade 
(Washington:—The Brookings Institution,—forthcoming 1989) . 
2; See for example, William V. Rapp, "Japan's Invisible Barriers to Trade," 
in Thomas A. Pugel, ed., Fragile Interdependence: Economic Issues in 
U.S.-Japanese Trade and Investment (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 
1986); C. Fred Bergsten and William R. Cline, The United States-Japan 
Economic Problem (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 
1985), pp. 53-72; Bela Belassa and Marcus Noland, Japan In the World 
Economy (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1988), pp. 
49-62; Ryutaro Komiya and Motoshige Itoh, "Japan's International Trade 
Continued on next page 
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Without repeating the litany of formal and informal restraints at 
length, it is possible to briefly review the evidence on Japan. Early in 
the postwar era, Japan erected very stiff tariff and quota barriers. Under 
the authority of the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, 
all imports were subject in principle to government control through import 
licences. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry exercised 
enormous power through its control over allocation of the foreign exchange 
budget from which import licenses were granted, which in effect amounted to 
a quota on all imports. Some items were decontrolled later in the 1950s 
(by granting automatic licenses), but the direct control system remained 
very extensive. Not until Japan came under increasing pressure within the 
GATT and the IMF to dismantle its stiff import barriers did any real change 
take place. Most quota restrictions were eliminated in the early 1960s, 
although in many cases liberalization of particular products was accompanied 
by imposition of high tariffs. According to Japanese calculations at the 
time, 60 percent of all Japanese imports were subject to quota restrictions 
Continued from previous page 
and Trade Policy, 1955-1984," in Takeshi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, 
eds., The Political Economy of Japan; Volume 2'The Changing 
International Context (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); or 
the more anecdotal approach adopted in Clyde V. PreslowiLz, Jr., Trading-
Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead (New York: Basic Books, 
1988). In addition, the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
must report to Congress each year on trade barriers in other nations, 
including Japan; see Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. 
3. For a review of this period in Japan's import policies see Warren S. 
Hunsberger, Japan and the United States in World Trade (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1964), pp. 133-141. 
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in 1960, and liberalization reduced that percentage to only 11 percent by 
1963.4 
Since the process of import liberalization began in the early 1960s, 
formal quota and tariff barriers have steadily fallen. By the 1980s Japan 
had lower average tariffs on industrial products than other industrial 
nations and fewer quantitative restrictions. No one denies that Japan has 
made impressive progress in dismantling the vast array of formal barriers 
which characterized the earlier postwar period, although the few instances 
of high tariffs or quotas which remain often happen to be on products of 
importance or interest to Japan's trading partners. Relatively high tariffs 
continued in the 1980s on whiskey, biscuits, chocolates, and plywood, while 
stringent quotas remained on beef, citrus fruit and several other 
agricultural products. Even these remaining formal barriers are in the 
process of being negotiated away, with the quotas on beef and citrus fruit, 
for example, to be lifted in 1991. Despite this continued formal opening 
of the market, however, the sense of pervasive restrictions through more 
informal means has persisted. These are the implicit restraints which are 
so difficult to verify and to remove because by their very nature they are 
deniable. 
4. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho [Trade "White 
Paper], 1963 edition (Tokyot Ministry of Finance Printing Office, 19 63), 
p. 147. 
5. Mirroring the actions of the early 1960s, the elimination of the beef and 
citrus quotas will be followed by imposition of high tariff barriers—a 
jump from 15 percent to 70 percent on beef (in 1991, falling to 50 
percent in 1993) and continuation of 20 percent off-season and 40 percent 
in-season tariffs on oranges. See Susan MacKnight, "Japan to Free 
Imports of Beef and Citrus," JEI Report No., 24B, June 24, 1988, pp. 15-
17. 
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Table 1 lists the principal types of informal import barriers which 
attracted the attention of American negotiators in the 1980s and examples of 
products that have been affected by them. This listing includes only those 
actions by government or industry which are obvious policy decisions and 
leaves out general cultural or business behavior patterns that may have the 
effect of restricting imports. Problems related to some of the specific 
products included in the table have been partially or fully solved, but 
others have not. 
A broader picture of Japan's trade behavior is presented in table 2. 
Japan imports substantially fewer manufactured goods than other nations, 
regardless of whether the measure is the ratio of manufactured imports to 
GNP or to domestic manufacturing output. In 1987, the ratio of manufactured 
imports to GDP was only 2.4 percent, with the United States (7.3 percent), 
Italy (10.0 percent), and Spain (10.9 percent) the only other industrial 
nations on the list at all close to Japan. Among the developing countries 
listed, only India is close to Japan. The comparison is even more stark 
when it is based on imports as a share of domestic manufacturing output (GDP 
originating in the manufacturing sector), with Japan the only nation on the 
list below 10 percent. Japan is not just lower, it is startlingly lower 
than any other country in the table. 
Furthermore, many of the nations listed in this table exhibit 
substantial increases in the share of manufactured imports in their 
economies over time.—As a share of GDP, manufactured imports in the United 
States almost tripled, from 2.5 percent to 7.3 percent from 1970 to 1987. 
Substantial increases also occurred in France, West Germany, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. Even South Korea, a developing country actively pursuing 
Table 1 
Informal Barriers in the 1980s 
Table 2 
Manufactured Imports in the Economy 
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industrial policies to build its domestic manufacturing sector, shows a 
large increase in import penetration over time in its economy. 
As formal trade barriers around the world have fallen in the postwar 
era, and transportation costs have dropped, consumption patterns in 
industrial nations have converged somewhat. These trends led to the 
increases in import penetration shown in the table. Countering this trend, 
oil prices rose dramatically in the 1970s, and one of the rebuttals often 
heard concerning the low level of manufacturing imports in Japan is that the 
rising cost of oil (and the weakening exchange rate which accompanied it) 
prevented a rise in manufactured import shares in the economy. However, 
France, West Germany, and the United States all suffered from similar 
problems. In addition, from 1980 to 1987 the price of oil dropped 
dramatically while the yen rose. Despite these developments, imports as 
both a share of total GDP and of value-added in manufacturing fell. The 
only other nations showing such a trend in the share of manufactured imports 
to value-added in manufacturing are South Africa and Thailand, hardly 
exemplary comparisons. Even without turning to more sophisticated economic 
measures, the failure of manufactured import penetration to rise over this 
long 17-year period is highly suggestive that protectionism remains. 
This picture is reinforced by looking at intra-industry trade. This 
phenomenon, in which nations both export and import a product, is very 
extensive among industrial nations. The notion of a two-way flow of goods 
in a particular product would seem Lo contradict comparative advantage 
theory, which is an explanation of why a nation should either export or 
import a product, but not both. Intra-industry trade began as an empirical 
observation as economists investigated trade patterns in the postwar era, 
and they have since developed a variety of theoretical explanations for why 
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such trade exists. However, the theory is less important than the fact that 
this trade is very extensive, especially among industrial nations. Table 3 
presents a comparison across a number of countries based on the standard 
statistic which economists use to measure the incidence of intra-industry 
trade.6 
My own research has concentrated on a more detailed look at the intra-
industry trade phenomenon, which shows Japan to be very distinctive. Basic 
intra-industry trade data on 5 countries—Japan, the United States, West 
Germany, France, and South Korea--are summarized in table 4. Looking at all 
traded products, Japan's average level of intra-industry trade has been far 
below that of other countries. In 1985, Japan's average IIT index number 
was only 23, less than half that of the United States, and even farther 
below those of France and West Germany. Not only is Japan lower, but its 
level of intra-industry trade failed to rise significantly over time. The 
level in 1985 was virtually unchanged from that reported by others for Japan 
as far back as 1964, and not much higher than in 1959. The United States, 
France, and West Germany, in contrast, all show large increases over time. 
If the comparison is shifted from all products to manufactured goods the 
disparity remains. Japan's level of intra-industry trade has been virtually 
constant since the mid-1970s at a level that is actually lower than in 1970. 
As of 1985, Japan's IIT index number of 26 was only 43 percent the level of 
6. That measure for a particular industry is: 
IIT^ = 100 * [1 - |x£ - m i|/(x£ + m^)], where x^ = exports of industry i 
products, and m^ = imports of industry i products. This produces a 
statistic which varies over the interval [0,100], with 0 representing no 
intra-industry trade (either exports or imports equal zero), and 100 
representing complete intra-industry trade (imports exactly equal 
exports). An average level for a nation can be calculated by summing 
across industries using shares in total trade as weights: 
IIT = SUMjJIITi * (X£ + mj^ ) / (X + M) ], where X and M are total exports and 
total imports of the nation. 
Table 3 
International Comparison of Intra-Industry Trade Levels 
Table 4 
Average Intra-Industry Levels 
Based on 3-digit SITC industry classification 
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the United States. In all other countries in the sample, intra-industry 
trade levels were higher in 1985 than in 1970; only in Japan has it fallen. 
This comparison is not affected materially by using a more disaggregated 4-
digit industry classification. Even south Korea, a relatively small 
developing country that should exhibit low levels of intra-industry trade, 
had an IIT index number in 1985 that was twice as high as Japan's, and 
demonstrated an enormous rise in intra-industry trade over time, also in 
strong contrast to Japan. 
If the comparison is shifted from global levels of intra-industry trade 
to bilateral trade, Japan still appears low, as shown in table 5, based on 
bilateral trade flows in manufactured products. In 1985, the level of 
intra-industry trade characterizing Japan's bilateral trade with the other 
countries was considerably below that of most other countries.7 The United 
States in 1985, for example, displays an IIT index number for its trade with 
France (53) and West Germany (36) that is double or more the level with 
Japan (19). Even U.S. trade with South Korea generated a higher IIT index 
number (26) than did trade with Japan. The experience of France is similar, 
with its bilateral intra-industry trade with West Germany (73) and the 
United States (52) much higher than with Japan (25). Only West Germany 
shows a similarity in its IIT pattern, with rough parity in the level for 
its trade with the United States (41) and Japan (39). Despite this one 
exception, the general conclusion remains that Japan's pattern of bilateral 
7. Because of differences in data collection among countries, as well as the 
difference between the value of f.o.b. exports and ci.f. imports, the 
numbers in the upper-right half of the table differ by minor amounts from 
those in the lower-left half in most cases. 
Table 5 
Bilateral Intra-Industry Trade 
1985 
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intra-industry trade with developed countries is distinctly lower than what 
prevails among other industrial countries. 
Over time the disparity has widened. In 1970, Japan's bilateral trade 
with other developed countries did not appear to be unusual. Both West 
German and French trade with the United States was characterized by a degree 
of intra-industry trade similar to their trade with Japan. From a U.S. 
perspective, intra-industry trade with Japan was only somewhat lower than 
with these other two. Since that time the degree of intra-industry trade on 
a bilateral basis with Japan has consistently fallen for all three of these 
trading partners. The IIT index number for U.S./Japan dropped steadily from 
31 to 19, while that for France/Japan dipped from 44 to 25, and that of West 
Germany/Japan fell somewhat less from 43 to 39. 
Japan is also strikingly different from other countries on the question 
of the connection between exports and intra-industry trade. Figure 1 
presents a simple visual approach to this question. The horizontal axis in 
this diagram divides the intra-industry trade index into 21 intervals: 0, 
0<IIT<5, . . ., 95<IIT<100. The vertical axis measures the share of the 
dollar value of total manufactured exports which fall in each of these 
intervals, based on 3-digit industry categories. Although one might expect 
that the result would be a normal distribution centered on the mean for each 
country, figure 1 shows that the actual distribution is much more diffuse 
and uneven. However, Japan is astoundingly different from other industrial 
countries. An extraordinarily high sharer of its exports--53 percent—falls 
o 
in the intervals of 0<IIT<15.° The other countries have very few of their 
8. For the IIT index number to equal 15, exports must be approximately 12 
times larger than imports (or visa versa). 
Figure 1 
["lantif actu re d -ex ports—1985 
'Share of Exports In Each HI Interval 
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exports in this low range: the United States has only 3 percent, France 0.5 
percent, and West Germany 0.1 percent. South Korea is closer to the 
Japanese pattern (with 31 percent of its exports in this range), but its 
high concentration at this bottom end of the scale is offset by a large 
share of exports at the upper end of the scale as well. Conversely, very 
few of Japan's exports are in industries where the level of the intra-
industry trade index is high. Only 5.3 percent of the value of Japan's 
exports are in industries where the IIT index is greater than 75, compared 
to 56 percent for the United States, 32 percent for West Germany, and 78 
percent for France. Even South Korea has 31 percent of its exports in this 
range. 
The same analysis can be extended to bilateral trade. In this case, 
some similarity exists between Japan and West Germany, with a heavy 
concentration of their exports to the United States at the lower end of the 
intra-industry index scale (because of the large share of their exports in a 
very unbalanced motor vehicle trade). But the reverse perspective, U.S. 
exports to other countries, shows something quite different. American 
exports to these countries are not concentrated in low IIT ranges. Thus 
trading behavior is strongly asymmetrical; while Japan enjoys (or enforces) 
limited import competition to its major exports, its trading partners do not 
benefit from a similar lack of competition to their own exports to Japan. 
This analysis does not lend itself as easily to the visual format used 
above, and the basic results are summarized in table 6. This table shows 
average intra-industry levels in bilateral relationships calculated with 
three separate weights for individual industries: the share of each 
industry in total manufactured trade (that is, the normal calculation of 
average intra-industry trade), the share of each industry in total 
Table 6 
Average IIT Levels Weighted by Total Trade, Exports, and Imports 
Bilateral Trade Between the United States and the Listed Countries 
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manufactured exports, and the share of each industry in total manufactured 
imports. The data in all cases are based on the United States as the 
reporting country: exports are U.S. exports to the other country and 
imports are U.S. imports from the other country. In all cases, the separate 
weightings by exports and imports give quite different results, but for 
trade with Japan, the disparity is startling. For example, in 1985, the 
average intra-industry trade index number weighted by U.S. exports to Japan 
was 40, whereas the average level for U.S. imports from Japan was only 16. 
Thus, the United States accepts considerable imports from Japan in the 
same industries in which the United States exports to Japan (yielding an 
average IIT index number of 40), but is able to export very little to Japan 
in those industries in which Japan has heavy exports to the United States 
(yielding an IIT index number of 16). While there is also a disparity 
between the two weighting schemes for U.S. trade with France and West 
Germany, the differences in both 1970 and 1985 in the results from the 
various weights were much larger for trade with Japan than with other 
countries (shown in the final column in the table). The big distinction 
comes in the weighting by imports. In both 1970 and 1985, U.S. imports from 
West Germany and France were in industries with sizable levels of bilateral 
intra-industry trade (that is, in which the United States was also able to 
export similar products to these countries), in contrast to much lower 
levels for U.S. imports from Japan. 
U.S. trade with Japan in both years most closely resembles that with 
South Korea, with much lower IIT index numbers generated by import share 
weighting than by export sharer weighting. However, even with South Korea, 
the ratio of the IIT numbers generated by the two weighting schemes (2.00 in 
1970 and 2.42 in 1985) are not as extreme as in the case of Japan. The 
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implication of this comparison is that Japan is similar in its behavior to 
South Korea--a developing country pursuing vigorous industrial policies, 
including protection of home markets. 
Explaining Japanese Patterns 
A number of different approaches can be taken in looking for 
explanations for Japan's distinctive trade patterns. These might by loosely 
categorized as the direct approach (cataloguing and estimating the impact of 
known barriers), the business school approach (looking at distinctively 
successful aspects of Japanese competition), the unit labor cost approach 
(looking at Japan's cost position relative to other countries), the Chenery 
approach (looking at general economic factors explaining the overall level 
of manufactured imports), the comparative advantage approach (looking for 
conformity to predictions of comparative advantage models), the intra-
industry trade approach (looking for economic factors explaining intra-
industry trade results), and the behavioral approach (seeking behavioral 
evidence on the preferences of firms in business dealings). 
Direct estimates. Several attempts have been made to estimate the 
impact of known trade barriers on Japanese imports. In 1984 the Department 
of Commerce estimated that removal of all known barriers would increase U.S. 
exports to Japan by $16.9 billion (in 1982), based on the assumption that in 
the absence of barriers, American market shares in the Japanese market would 
equal American market shares in the world market. Bergsten and Cline re-
estimated the Commerce data, dropping the assumption that market shares 
would necessarily be as high as in world markets, arriving at an estimate of 
V 
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$5-8 billion in additional U.S. sales to Japan. Their intent was to 
provide a crude estimate which as necessarily arbitrary. However, their 
rejection of a large increase in market share for cigarettes was clearly 
wrong; with the complete removal of barriers on cigarettes, imports (mostly 
from the United States) have expanded from one percent of the market to 
approximately 12 percent. Their estimate of expanded U.S. sales, therefore, 
may be too low. 
Even that more modest estimate represented a 20 to 34 percent increase in 
U.S. exports to Japan--a substantial amount. The precise dollar impact of 
trade barriers is not particularly important beyond the general conclusion 
that a study which intended to show that Japan was relatively open found a 
potentially large expansion of imports in the absence of barriers. 
The business school approach. Over the past two decades, Japanese 
manufacturing corporations have attracted increasing attention from 
specialists on business. These studies suggest that Japanese firms have 
made important technological breakthroughs which have simultaneously reduced 
the cost of manufacturing and increased product quality (measured in terms 
of defect rates). Management of the flow of parts through the factory; 
organization and tight control over inventories; engagement of blue-collar 
workers in production and quality control processes; cooperative interaction 
among engineers, marketing people, accountants, and factory managers in 
creating new products; new concepts in plant maintenance to reduce downtime 
and increase product quality; and aggressive reduction of the variety of 
9. C. Fred Bergsten and William R. Cline, The United States-Japan Economic 
Problem (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1984), pp. 
109-116. 
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parts in products, have all been part of the revolution in Japanese firms.10 
Now an increasing number of books is being published in English from some of 
the engineers who were intimately involved in these developments. ^  These 
studies do not directly address the question of low imports in Japan, but if 
they were to do so, the response would likely be to state that the advantage 
which the Japanese have in manufacturing over other industrial countries is 
so overwhelming that low imports is a natural outcome. 
Even if the Japanese have carried out a revolution in manufacturing, 
however, questions remain. Why should this advantage be across all 
industries? Imports have also been limited in areas such as forest products 
where evidence suggests that the domestic industry is quite inefficient, and 
in other product areas where there is no compelling evidence that Japanese 
firms are better than their Western counterparts. Furthermore, even if the 
Japanese have had a cost advantage, the premise of intra-industry is product 
differentiation and specialization. Why should Japan and no other major 
industrial country be able to efficiently cover all conceivable variations 
of a product? 
10. James C. Abegglen and George Stalk, Jr., Kaisha: The Japanese 
Corporation, How Marketing, Money and Manpower Strategy, Not Management 
Style, Make the Japanese World Pace-Setters (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc.
 f 1985) is one of tho hPst--lrnnT.m Pvamplpg nf t-Vio writing f^i thiq 
topic. 
11. Two recent examples are Taiichi Ohno (a former production engineer at 
Toyota Motor Corporation), Workplace Management (Cambridge: 
Productivity Press, 1988); and Ryuji Fukuda (formerly of Meidensha), 
Managerial Engineering: Techniques for Improving Quality and 
Productivity in the Workplace (Cambridge: Productivity Press, 1984). 
This publisher, Productivity Press, has specialized, in fact, in 
translating and selling such books to a Western audience. 
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Kazuo Sato attempts to make such an argument, using the economic theory 
of economies of scope. His point is that the demand for differentiated 
products in Japan is effectively met by domestic firms who understand and 
cater to these demands more efficiently than do foreign producers. 2 This 
remains an intriguing idea, and may explain some of Japan's distinctiveness, 
but is still unsatisfying. Japan has nearby neighbors (South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong) who have proved adept at meeting wide variations of demand in 
the United States for differentiated products; why should they be unable to 
do so for Japan? 
The notion that Japan has acquired some technological advantage which 
other industrial nations do no possess is a further problem with this 
approach. Either the rest of the world has been sadly remiss in not 
following this development or else the advantages are so bound up in 
Japanese culture that they cannot be copied. The former explanation has 
some truth to it, since American and European firms appear to have become 
interested in "Japanese management" only in the 1980s. The latter 
explanation would be quite unsettling if true, but much of what the Japanese 
have done inside the factory does not appear to be so closely connected to 
Japanese culture. Indeed, the business press now carries stories of U.S. 
firms who appear to have duplicated most or all of the features of Japanese 
manufacturing innovation. J 
12. Kazuo Sato "Increasing Returns and International Trade: The Case of 
Japan," unpublished paper, February 1986. 
13. See, for example, Ronald Henkoff, "This Cat is Acting Like a Tiger," 
Fortune, December 19, 1988. 
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To the extent that the low level of imports is related to technological 
advantage, the interest of foreign firms in those practices, the outpouring 
of books, the plethora of consulting firms promoting these practices, and 
the wave of Japanese foreign direct investment embodying many of these 
techniques should lead to a Japan that is far less distinctive in the 
future. 
Unit labor costs. A broader variant of the technological advantage 
approach leads to Don Daly's work with unit labor costs. According to his 
detailed calculations, a combination of exchange rate movements, rapid 
productivity growth, and low wage growth kept unit labor costs in Japanese 
manufacturing well below those in the United States, Canada, or European 
nations. He finds that costs were so much lower in Japan that the limited 
ability of foreign products to penetrate the market is not particularly 
surprising.1^ The rapid movement in exchange rates since 1985 has more than 
offset Japan's advantage in unit labor costs, however, leading Daly to 
expect that manufactured imports will now rise as a share of GNP. 
This approach is more satisfying than the business school "Japanese 
management" approach because it represents a combination of both micro and 
macroeconomic features. That is, the Japanese may have generated higher 
productivity growth through their revolution in manufacturing, but their 
international cost advantage can be fully offset through currency 
appreciation. In a sense, the question becomes one of explaining why the 
14. Donald J. Daly, "Canada's International Competitiveness," in Alan 
Rugman, ed., International Business in Canada: Strategies for 
Management (Scarborough Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1989), p. 46. His 
observations on Japan are developed further in "Japanese Manufacturing 
Competitiveness: Implications for International Trade," University of 
Toronto-York University Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Working 
Paper Series, No. 53. 
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yen remained weak relative to purchasing power parity calculations for much 
of the 1970s and 1980s. The answer to that question should lie mainly in 
macroeconomic variables rather than in microeconomic ones. Now that yen 
appreciation has offset the production cost advantage of the Japanese, 
imports should rise rapidly and Japan should appear to be less distinctive. 
Change is taking place, but as discussed below, not as rapidly as one would 
expect. 
Chenery studies. Those economists attempting to explain the simple 
variation in the ratio of imports to GNP or manufacturing output generally 
come to the conclusion that Japan's behavior is unusual, even after 
adjustment is made for economic factors. These studies follow the lines 
initially used by Hollis Chenery, positing that the level of imports 
(relative to total domestic output) in a nation will vary with per capita 
income (as an indicator of economic development) and population (as a size 
indicator). 5 Kazuo Sato, looking at manufactured imports relative to 
domestic manufactured output, uses population, the ratio of net imports of 
raw materials to GDP in manufacturing, plus dummy variables for EEC 
membership, non-EEC European nations, and Japan. This formulation assumes 
that larger nations (in terms of population) import relatively less (because 
they have larger, more developed domestic manufacturing sectors), while the 
need to import raw materials could affect the ability to absorb manufactured 
imports, and that the institution of the European Economic Community, as 
well as the existence of common land borders among Rnrnppan naMong 
15. Hollis B. Chenery, "Patterns of Industrial Growth," American Economic 
Review, Vol. 67, September 1960, pp. 624-654; and Hollis B. Chenery and 
M. Syrquin, Patterns of Development. 1950-1970 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1975). Chenery was interested in a wide variety of 
aspects of the economic process and not trade per se. 
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(regardless of EEC membership), are relevant factors in explaining the level 
of manufactured imports. His regressions show a negative coefficient for 
the Japan dummy variable that is significantly different from zero, implying 
that Japan's import level is unusually low; the other variables are 
insufficient to completely account for the low level of imports. ° 
Bela Belassa and Marcus Noland reach similar conclusions with a variety 
of slightly different equations. Explaining manufactured imports as a ratio 
to GNP, they use GDP per capita, population, raw material imports as a share 
of total imports, transportation costs, plus European and Japan dummy 
variables as explanatory variables. They too, conclude that Japan's low 
level of imports cannot be adequately explained by the economic variables. 
Their conclusion stands even when alternative dependent and independent 
variables are used in the equations. 
A final study by Lucia Barbone runs similar regressions, using per 
capita GNP (plus GNP squared), population (plus the log of population 
squared), as well as an estimate of transportation costs and the usual dummy 
•I Q 
variables. He, too, finds that the dummy variable for Japan is negative 
and significantly different from zero. 
16. Kazuo Sato, "Increasing Returns and International Trade: The Case of 
Japan," unpublished paper, February 1986. 
17. Bela Belassa and Marcus Nfnlanrl, Japan in the World Economy—(Washington: 
Institute for International Economics, 1988), pp. 239-254. By including 
GDP per capita, their specification is somewhat closer to the original 
Chenery model than is Sato's specification. 
18. Based on Takeuchi, "Does Japan Import Less Than It Should?" (Washington: 
The World Bank, Policy, Planning and Research Working Papers, July 1988, 
WPS 63). This paper provides an excellent overview of competing 
economic analyses of Japan's import behavior, although he reaches no 
strong conclusions. 
v 
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The overwhelming conclusion of various specifications of the Chenery 
approach to explaining imports of manufactured goods is that Japan is 
unusual. Whereas the distinctiveness of European countries--with import 
levels higher than predicted by economic factors — stems from their 
participation in the relatively free trade area of the European Economic 
Community and from their common land borders, the distinctively low level of 
Japan's imports must stem from implicit protectionism. 
Comparative advantage. Defenders of Japan's normality have relied on 
studies of conformity to comparative advantage theory. Put simply, this 
theory states that among the array of products which a nation is capable of 
producing at a given moment in time, it exports those in which it is 
relatively more efficient compared to other nations. Conversely, it imports 
those products in which it is relatively less efficient. As currently 
developed, the theory goes on to state that nations should have a 
comparative advantage in exporting products which use intensely the 
factor(s) of production which they possess in relative abundance. This is a 
theory with great intuitive appeal; nations with abundant labor but not much 
capital stock export labor-intensive products, while nations with limited 
labor but abundant capital export capital-intensive goods. 9 
According to this theory, a nation could be more efficient at producing 
all products than other nations and still benefit from trade — the key word 
19. All introductory international economics texts explain comparative 
advantage in its modern form. For one explanation, see Charles P. 
Kindleberger and Peter Lindert, International Economics, Sixth Edition 
(Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1978), pp. 15-17, which provides 
both a history of comparative advantage from its origin in the writings 
of David Ricardo. In its modern form, the theory of comparative 
advantage is often known as the Hechsler-Ohlin theory or the Hechsler-
Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) theory. 
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is comparative. A nation more efficient at producing all products than 
other nations benefits by exporting those in which its lead relative to 
other nations is the least. For raw materials, on the other hand, absolute 
advantage may determine much of world trade patterns; nations export or 
import these materials depending on whether or not they have a natural 
endowment of them. Thus, Japan imports oil because it has an absolute 
disadvantage in oil production (it has virtually no oil reserves), but it 
imports labor-intensive cotton textiles because it has a comparative 
disadvantage in such products. 
If a nation is unusually protectionist, or engages in unusually 
predatory policies to push exports as part of an overall strategy of 
industrial policy, then the resulting trade pattern ought to be different 
from purely market-determined outcomes. If one accepts static comparative 
advantage as the principal theory to explain the international trade result 
that should follow from smoothly functioning competitive markets, then 
comparative advantage becomes the norm against which actual trade results 
should be measured. Thus, if protectionism or other aspects of industrial 
policy in Japan has distorted the allocation of resources toward certain 
industries and away from other, then the actual pattern of exports and 
imports may be different from what a comparative advantage model would 
predict. 
The main proponent of explaining Japan's trade behavior through 
comparative advantage theory has been Gary Saxonhouse. who has explored this 
concept through a number of writings.20 In this model, net exports (exports 
20. The first articulation of the Saxonhouse position was in "Evolving 
Comparative Advantage and Japan's Imports of Manufacturers," in Kozo 
Yamamura, ed., Policy and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy: 
Continued on next page 
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minus imports) in individual industries are hypothesized to be the result of 
capital, labor, raw material, and land endowments in each of the countries 
included in the sample, as well as distance from markets. The production 
relationship for each industry is assumed to be a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function (in which no economies of scale exist). Using this 
model, Saxonhouse finds that as a highly industrialized, high-wage nation 
with a high capital/labor ratio, Japan has a preponderance of its net 
exports in those industries which use capital intensively and net imports in 
labor-intensive industries, just as one would anticipate from comparative 
advantage theory. By estimating the model across a sample of countries and 
over time without the Japanese data, and then comparing the actual results 
for Japan to the predictions of the estimated equations when applied to 
Japan's values for capital, labor, and other factors, he finds only a small 
list of industries in which a dummy variable for Japan is significant. 
Other nations in the sample also have some industries with significant 
country dummy variables, so that Japan does not appear peculiar at all. 
This approach to analyzing Japan's trade structure has been quite 
controversial and has sparked a vigorous debate. The original model was 
criticized for its use of net exports, a simplistic distance measure as one 
of the explanatory variables, and for the unrealistic assumption of no 
Continued from previous page 
American and Japanese Perspectives (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1982). More recent versions include "Japan's Intractable Trade 
Surpluses In a New Era," The World Economy, September 1986, pp. 239-258; 
and "Comparative Advantage, Structural Adaption, and Japanese 
Performance," in Inoguchi and Okimoto, eds., The Political Economy of 
Japan: Vol. 2'The Changing International Context. 
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economies of scale. Use of net exports is especially troubling since this 
measure does not directly address the question of Japan's import structure. 
Widely differing patterns of imports are compatible with net trade outcomes 
that conform to comparative advantage. 
Saxonhouse has responded to these criticisms with a new model which 
measures imports of particular products (as a share of GNP), rather than net 
trade, and also drops distance from markets as an explanatory variable. His 
basic approach remains the same—estimation of equations for each of 62 
industries over a cross-section of nations, in which capital and labor 
stocks in each country, as well as education levels, oil and coal reserves, 
and land area are the explanatory variables. Japan is excluded in 
estimating the equations and then predictions for Japan from the equations 
are compared to actual results. His conclusions for Japan remain the same; 
in only eight of the 62 industries does Japan's import level differ 
significantly from the prediction, and for all industries together the 
hypothesis that the actual import levels differ from the prediction is 
rejected. 1 
These new results are interesting and do address some of the criticisms 
of Saxonhouse's earlier work. However, this new research is unlikely to end 
the controversy. First, the list of product categories includes a large 
number of raw materials concerning which no one argues that Japan imports 
too little because trade is dictated by absolute (dis)advantage. Second, 
among the manufactured products, the greatest detail in the Saxonhouse model 
21. Gary R. Saxonhouse, "Differentiated Products, Economies of Scale and 
Access to the Japanese Market," Research Seminar in International 
Economics, Department of Economics, The University of Michigan, Seminar 
Discussion Paper No. 228, October 1988. 
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is provided on chemicals, one of the only industries in which Japan's 
behavior is less distinctive from that of other nations. Third, the 
countries used to estimate the equations include a number that are 
distinctively protectionist, such as Australia, India, Indonesia, and 
Norway. Indeed, many of the countries are developing nations which are 
likely to have protectionist policies and somewhat peculiar import patterns 
generated by incomplete manufacturing sectors. At least 17 countries out of 
the 41 fall in this category, and a looser definition of developing country 
could produce more. Fourth, this research gives us a picture at one moment 
in time. Overall, Japan's manufactured imports as a share of GNP have not 
risen over time while those of other countries have. If Japan's import 
patterns were normal in 1979, then, does this imply that Japan had unusually 
high imports in earlier years? Finally, one wonders why this disaggregated 
work on imports yields such different results from the Chenery-type models 
discussed above that analyze overall manufactured imports. 
Intra-industry trade models. Little work has been done on generalized 
tests of Japan's conformity to intra-industry trade models. However, a 
number of results have emerged from the intra-industry trade literature 
including that the level of such trade rises with the degree of economic 
development, rises with economic size, and rises as import barriers fall. 
None of these characterizations fits Japan; as Japan moved from developing 
nation status in the 1960s to advanced industrial status in the 1980s with 
an economy which grew rapidly and is now the second largest in the world,  
intra-industry trade theorists would predict that the degree of such trade 
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in Japan would rise substantially. z But, as discussed above, the degree of 
intra-industry trade for Japan in the 1980s was no higher than in 1970 or 
earlier. 
One study working on a variant of intra-industry trade has been 
attempted. Robert Lawrence uses a model developed by Helpman-Krugman, which 
hypothesizes that the share of imports of a particular product relative to 
total domestic consumption of that product will be a function of the share 
of that nation's production of the product relative to total consumption of 
it in all other countries. A variant of this model relates import shares 
in an industry to that nation's exports as a share of world consumption. 
Testing both versions of this hypothesis, Lawrence finds that Japan remains 
distinctive just as the Chenery-type models on overall manufactured imports 
find. The assumptions in the Lawrence model are quite restrictive, but it 
has added another way of looking at Japan's distinctive import pattern. 
Behavioral evidence. New evidence based on direct evidence of business 
practices by Japanese firms supports the contention of a bias away from 
foreign products. Looking at the purchases of capital equipment and 
industrial supplies in Japanese, American, and European manufacturing 
22. Studies of the characteristics of intra-trade across countries and what 
determines the differences include the seminal work by Herbert G. Grubel 
and P. J. Lloyd, Intra-industry Trade: The Theory and Measurement of 
International Trade in Differentiated Products (New York; John Wiley 
and Sons, 1975); plus Rudolf Loertscher and Frank Woltner, "Determinants 
of Intra-industry Trade: Among Countries and Across Industries," 
Weltmirtsch. Arch., 1980, vol. 116, no. 2; and L Gavelin and L. Lundber, 
"Determinants of Intra-industry Trade: Testing Some Hypotheses on 
Swedish Data," in P. K. Tharakan, ed., Intra-industry Trade: Empirical 
and Methodological Aspects (New York: North-Holland, 1983). 
23. Robert Z. Lawrence, "Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Minds?" 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1987, No. 2, pp. 517-554. 
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subsidiaries operating in Australia, Mordechai Kreinin finds that Japanese 
subsidiaries exhibit a strong preference for Japanese products. ^  He finds 
no such preference for products of their own (or any other) nationality at 
American or European subsidiaries. This disparity is visible in both the 
actual purchasing patterns and the criteria listed by managers of these 
subsidiaries for deciding which products to buy. This evidence implies that 
even when stripped of a protective home government, Japanese firms still 
demonstrate a national buying preference which is distinctive from firms of 
other countries. 
Evaluation 
The multiplicity of studies reviewed above presents a confusing array of 
opposing results. Some of the evidence in Japan's favor cannot be ignored; 
low imports are not entirely the result of explicit or implicit 
protectionism. Some of the evidence of important technological advances in 
the manufacturing process in Japanese firms as well as the broader evidence 
offered by unit labor cost comparisons cannot be denied and generate some 
support for why Japan might have a level of manufactured imports that is 
lower than in other nations. The comparative advantage studies of Gary 
Saxonhouse, on the other hand, are rather unsatisfying; the use of net 
exports, distance variables, and now an odd country list and peculiar 
industrial indexes leave plenty of room for criticism. 
An overwhelming cost advantage from a revolution in manufacturing  
processes combined with the macroeconomic variables (exchange rates and wage 
24. Mordechai E. Kreinin, "How Closed is Japan's Market," World Economy, 
vol. 7, No. 4, December 1988, pp. 529-541. 
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settlements) could explain a^trtr of the Chenery-type results. Those models 
ignore macroeconomic develojoemts. 
Nevertheless, it remains dmfzficu.lt. to accept an overwhelming Japanese 
cost advantage as the only edpHana ti on of low manufactured imports. The 
lack of any significant change in import penetration over a rather prolonged 
period of time as formal trade barriers fell remains difficult to explain 
away merely as the result of cos-* advantages. Why should Japan have almost 
totally unresponsive to the rrec3uctiori in formal import barriers, in stark 
contrast to the experience off otbie r industrial nations? The notion that the 
Japanese would possess an advarntage across virtually all industries is also 
difficult to accept. Other mafcions do not have manufacturing sectors which 
are uniformly efficient acros=s aHl industries, and there is no reason to 
believe that Japan is unique in this regard. Furthermore, the notion of 
intra-industry trade does net- crest entirely on cost advantage; in a world of 
product differentiation there i_s room for high-cost manufacturers with 
distinctive designs to remain-i_n trie market. Japanese manufacturers have no 
particular dominance of all p cs=sible variations in product design in any 
industry, but Japan does staa d oiat as trie country with an extremely low 
level of intra-industry trade . 
Finally, the anecdotal er itLerace of barriers to entry in Japan is so 
pervasive that it simply cannot be dismissed as the objections of 
businessmen who do not "under st and" Japan. A number of large multinational 
corporations operating in marine tss around the world find prof?! ems in pnfRrincr 
Japan that they do not encoun-te r elsewhere. This anecdotal evidence also 
fits what we know about Japan^s e society and the historical pattern of its 
economic development. That d«v eLopmeat process has been one of strong 
economic nationalism fueled b;y a sense of uniqueness and a strong insularity 
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from developments in the rest of the world. One can argue that given a 
development process of this sort, domestic firms were able to establish 
dominance over the domestic market—through strong personal relationships 
with upstream or downstream producers and heavy control over distribution. 
That dominance would prove to be quite durable even if formal barriers to 
the market were reduced because of the non-economic values involved in 
Japanese social relationships. ^  
"Where does this leave us? Japan may not be quite so distinctive as the 
raw data suggest, but it does appear to be an implicitly protectionist 
nation. A key test for the explanation of Japan's low level of manufactured 
imports will come from the nation's response to the rapid appreciation of 
the yen since 1985, which ought to bring a rapid increase in imports. 
Recent Changes 
Manufactured imports in Japan have been rising rapidly in dollar terms 
since 1985--up at an average annual rate of 33 percent between 1985 and 1988 
(table 7). This rapid increase has been interpreted by the Japanese 
government as implying that major structural adjustment is taking place and 
that foreign criticism of import barriers is unjustified. However, the data 
should be interpreted cautiously. 
The development most widely cited by Japanese observers is the 
increasing share of manufacturers in total imports. Japan used to be 
criticized for its low ratio of manufactured to total importsf although  
Japanese government officials used to justify this outcome on the grounds of 
25. This explanation is pursued further below and in my forthcoming book, 
Japan's Unequal Trade. 
Table 7 
Japan's Trade in Manufactured Goods 
1980 to 1988 
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high import dependency on raw materials. Since 1985 this ratio has risen 
rapidly, reaching 43 percent in 1988 (and likely to exceed 50 percent in 
1989). This share was no longer conspicuously below that of other nations. 
This result though, is only partly due to rising manufactured imports, with 
the dramatic drop in raw material prices providing an equally important 
explanation. 
Furthermore, the rising dollar value of manufactured imports does not 
necessarily translate into larger yen amounts because the dollar has 
depreciated against the yen. In fact, the yen value of manufactured imports 
actually dropped in 1986, and did not exceed the 1985 value until 1988. 
Because the yen value has not risen significantly, manufactured imports as a 
share of GDP have actually fallen--from 3.0 percent in 1985 to 2.7 percent 
in 1988 (although this level represents a recovery from a temporary low of 
only 2.2 percent in 1986. How can a structural adjustment in which imports 
play a more important role be taking place if imports actually represent 
less of economic activity in Japan now than earlier in the 1980s? 
The other indicator worth looking at is intra-industry trade. There are 
several problems here, including a modification of the industrial 
classification scheme used by the Japanese government in 1988. However, 
calculation of the average IIT index number for manufactured products at a 
4-digit level, using yen-denominated Japanese data yields a 27 percent 
increase in the index, from 19.5 in 1985 to 24.8 in 1988. This is an 
encouraging rise, but not particularly largp, pgpprially giv^n t-hp 
substantial reduction in the yen-denominated manufactured good trade surplus 
that occurred over the same time. 
Some change has also occurred in the skewed pattern discussed earlier 
with the extremely heavy concentration of Japan's exports in very low IIT 
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intervals (figure 2). The share of exports in the IIT interval (0,5], for 
example, dropped from 38 percent to 15 percent, while that in the somewhat 
higher interval of (10, 15] rose from 9 percent to 25 percent. The share of 
exports in the interval (20,35] also rose somewhat. These are encouraging 
developments, to the extent that they represent a real phenomenon and are 
not just the result of the changing industrial classification in 1988. ° 
However, no improvement has taken place in IIT levels of 40 or above, and 
Japan's extremely low share of exports in that range was part of the major 
contrast with other countries. 
Table 8 shows the IIT index for the 12 largest export categories under 
the old CCCN classification in 1987 and their corresponding categories under 
the new HS classification of 1988 (consolidating those that had been further 
subdivided in the change). These data suggest the rise in IIT levels for 
the four largest exports is real, but is insignificant or negative for the 
rest of the list. 
A growing body of political science and sociology writing emphasizes the 
inability of Japan to respond quickly to new international or domestic 
conditions or to endorse new policy directions. ' The essence of these 
studies is that groups and group dynamics are the key variable in 
understanding Japanese behavior. Observers have long noted that Japanese 
26. Data for 1987 which are based on the samp rlflgsifiraH'nn a<? t-ho Idas 
data show basically the same shifts displayed in figure 2, although the 
improvement is not quite as large. 
27. Among these works are the recent popular book by Karel von Wolferen, The 
Enigma of Japanese Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989); Kent E. 
Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability 
in Japan, 1949-1986 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and 
Thomas Rohlen, "Order in Japanese Society: Attachment, Authority, and 
Routine," Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 1989. 
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Figure 2 
Japans Intro'Industry Trade, 1985-1988 
(shore of nicnufactured experts Ln ecch IIT LntervdL) 
Share of HanufaGUred Exports 
Table 8 
Japan's Level of Intra-Industry Trade for Major Export Products 
198\-1988 
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society is far more group-oriented than American society; if human behavior 
could be arranged on a continuum from complete individuality to complete 
group dominance, neither of our societies would be at the extremes, but we 
would be far apart along that spectrum. Although this is a commonplace 
observation about Japanese society, academics have more recently begun 
exploring the implications of a group-oriented society for economic policy 
making and political behavior. 
In such systems, disagreements or outside pressures lead to a dynamic 
which involves partial accommodation or compensation to reduce the threat 
posed. Sharp discontinuities in policy or behavior are rare, although 
change does take place. Overarching principles or ethics are not the 
primary determinant of behavior or policy formation; group dynamics dominate 
the process. Those in power may alter their behavior in the face of new 
conditions or challenges, but the accommodation will be slow and partial, 
especially if the challenges involve the government as an arbiter. As 
Thomas Rohlen notes: "it is in the art of compromise, consensus building, 
and lateral linkage that the government plays an indispensable role. The 
key term is always balance."28 Those in opposition will moderate or drop 
their opposition in the face of compensation or accommodation rather than 
continuing to press their own position. In determining the outcome, the 
hierarchy among or within groups is an important element.29 
28. Thomas Rohlen, "Order in Japanese Society," p. 32. The notion of the 
producing process producing stable balances of competing interests was a 
principal theme of John C. Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget 
Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 
29. Hierarchical structures in Japanese society are the dominant feature in 
Chie Nakane's seminal book Japanese Society ( ). Thomas Rohlen, "Order 
in Japanese Society," argues that she overemphasizes hierarchy and 
Continued on next page 
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These characteristics of Japanese society have an important bearing on 
economic behavior. The same principles which govern social groups are 
involved in interaction within and among firms, and between firms and 
government. Rodney Clark, for example, wrote of a "society of industry" in 
Japan, within which social concepts such as groups and hierarchy are very 
important determinants of economic behavior.30 Yasusuke Murakami has also 
explicitly coupled the social concepts of group behavior with Japanese 
economic behavior. The visible behavior of Japanese businessmen endorses 
the concept of different social behavior patterns shaping economic actions: 
the intense training to build corporate loyalty, the openness of the 
physical work environment with desks crowded in large open rooms, endless 
meetings, the deference corporations show toward government officials (and 
the frequency with which they consult with government officials before 
making decisions), and the extraordinary amount of time spend maintaining 
human contact with buyers and suppliers. These aspects of corporate 
behavior all attest to the different context in which corporate decisions 
Continued from previous page 
underemphasizes leaderless groups. Nevertheless, within the group 
context, hierarchy is generally a useful guide in predicting outcomes. 
30. Rodney Clark, The Japanese Company (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979), p. 50. 
31. Yasusuke Murakami, "The Japanese Model of Political Economy," in Kozo 
Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, eds., The Political Economy of Japan; 
Volume l'The Domestic Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1987). Murakami's approach, in which he uses the Japanese words 
ie (household) and mura (village) for group concepts (giving a sense of 
Japanese uniqueness to his views) has been controversial. See the 
symposium on ie_ society in The Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 11, No. 
1, Winter 1985, and especially Thomas Rohlen, "When Evolution Isn't 
Progressive." 
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are made in Japan, and this context implies that decisions are made which 
are not motivated purely by a calculation of economic gain or loss. These 
non-economic motivations of behavior provide a major reason to doubt that 
Japan's low level of manufactured imports are a result of economic factors 
alone. 
Japanese behavior patterns also provide good reason to be discouraged 
about the speed or extent to which Japanese trade behavior will change even 
under the impact of the stronger yen. The close social bonds between 
established buyers and sellers, the strong sense of hierarchy (in which 
foreign products and firms are relegated to low priorities), explicit or 
implicit cartels (often with informal government approval or encouragement), 
and a sense that at the broadest level Japan is a "group" to be protected 
from foreign products, are daunting obstacles to be overcome. 
Economic behavior though, is somewhat different from other forms of 
social interaction. Corporations may not be concerned with maximizing their 
profits, but the fact remains that they must earn some profit or ultimately 
go out of existence. That hard reality means that the priority they attach 
to their existing social bonds with other economic and political actors must 
be constrained somewhat; economic survival of the primary group (the 
corporation) must be more important than conforming to the expectations for 
behavior in wider groups. If existing relationships are not economically 
viable--if the price of domestic products is much higher than imports, for 
example—then firms can and must react at gnmg pn-int- , 
Economists, on the other hand, assume far too much rationality on the 
part of Japanese individuals and corporations. Economic necessity will 
bring changes in behavior, but these responses are always modified and 
limited by norms of Japanese social behavior. To the extent possible, 
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corporations will make decisions within the context of the groups within 
they operate--the web of their supplier/buyer network, other firms in their 
industry, and the industry/government connection. This context and the 
group dynamic which it implies means that economic rationality will be 
modified and moderated as it is bent to conform to social reality. 
How does all of this apply to imports? Yen appreciation will lead to 
more imports, but pressure from import-competing manufacturers and 
established distributors of domestic products must be listened to, 
accommodated, and compensated. These social necessities mean that the 
inroads of imports in the Japanese economy will be blunted. Rising imports 
are certainly possible--as the numbers discussed above demonstrate--but the 
rise may have a limit considerably below what would occur under similar 
circumstances in the United States or other Western societies with a less 
group-oriented social system. 
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